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 (MIS)SELECTION EFFECTS AND SOVEREIGNTY COSTS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF THE COSTS OF SANCTIONS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although sanctions have been a much discussed topic in the fields of Economics and Political 
Science for several decades, there remain few formal frameworks1 for explaining or predicting why some 
sanctions attempts are successful and others unsuccessful in terms of altering a target’s public policies.2  In 
one of the most widely cited studies of economic sanctions episodes, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott offer an 
arch-typical example of the vague explanations that beleaguer sanctions theory: 
"Sanctions often do not succeed in changing the behavior of foreign countries.  
One reason for failure is plain: the sanctions imposed may simply be inadequate to 
the task.  The goals may be too elusive, the means to gentle, or cooperation from 
other countries, when needed, too tepid." (1985: 10) 
 
Although these observations are undoubtedly true, we are still left far from understanding how to 
estimate the relative adequacy of sanction proceedings, or the likelihood of success for any given sanction 
episode.3 
Only negligible progress can be traced back to the use of historical case studies to determine the 
mechanisms that underscore decision-making processes of sender nations (Galtung 1967; Doxey 1971; 
Schreiber 1973; Strack 1978; Cross 1981). Nevertheless, according to Lopez and Cortright (1985: 7), a 
“conventional view” has developed; namely, that sanctions, even “costly” ones, are ineffective.  Though 
                                                          
1 In an analytical approach that parallels ours, Selden (1999, p.17) uses a model of tariff-distorted production to 
explain welfare loss to consumers and producer gain under sanction.  This research and several others take their 
inspiration from classical economic studies on optimum tariffs. For a classical model on optimum tariffs, see Harry 
G. Johnson (1953-54:142-53). 
2 In this analysis, we assume that the goal is to initiate change in the target's policy.  While states may use economic 
sanctions to pursue other goals or to achieve several objectives simultaneously (Baldwin 1985: 167), we are 
attempting to understand the conditions under which target states are likely to alter their policies in response to 
sanctions.  If a sender’s objective is less ambitious than a change in target policy, one could nevertheless conclude 
that a change in policy is still desirable.  It is therefore appropriate to study the cost of sanctions by the yardstick of 
whether or not change has followed. 
3 This is certainly not due to a lack of previous attempts to solve the sanction puzzle. See, inter alia, Galtung (1967), 
Doxey (1971), Dashti-Gibson et al. (1977), Baldwin (1985), Nossal (1989), Eaton and Engers (1992, 1999), Morgan 
and Schwebach (1995), Simon (1995), Smith (1995), Pape (1997), Drezner (1998, 1999, 2000), Drury (1998), 
Morgan and Miers (1999), Selden (1999), Hart (2000), Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000). 
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supported by many, including Doxey (1971), and Nincic, and Wallensteen (1983), this view belies 
frustration more than fact.  Occasionally, targets do acquiesce.4  Though the relationship is tenuous, cost as 
traditionally measured is perceived by most to be the main variable explaining the effectiveness of 
economic punishment (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Drury 1998; Hart 2000).   
Attempts to explain the frequent disconnect between “cost” and success have led some to 
introduce explanations that seem logically inconsistent.  For instance, some have argued that the cost of 
sanctions might be unrelated to their effectiveness because the credibility of a sender’s commitment can be 
enough to sway a target’s policy regardless of the costs associated with the sanctions themselves (Eaton 
and Engers 1992).  Using similar reasoning, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) assert that the cost of 
sanctions might not be directly related to their efficacy because even low cost sanctions can exacerbate 
unrest in the domestic arena of a target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988: 786).5  These theories 
may explain why some relatively low-cost sanctions induce change, but they do not address the question of 
why some “costly” sanctions do not lead to change.   
Alternatively, some suggest that countries that use repeated sanctions lack credibility, because they 
impose sanctions too often and therefore lack “seriousness” (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997: 616; see also 
Paarlberg 1983; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1985).  However, to the extent that the sanctions are really 
“imposed” (i.e. they lead to an actual interruption of trade), repeat users of sanctions should present a more 
credible threat.  If the frequent use of sanctions by a particular sender nation prompts potential targets to 
avoid trade with the sender altogether, then the supposed sanctions are in name only – imposing little or no 
cost and telling us little or nothing about the relationship between cost and success.   
Hufbauer et al. (1985: 12) have hypothesized that anomalous outcomes are explained by the 
“resolve” of target decision makers – a sudden increase in nationalistic fervor and social willingness to 
                                                          
4 The consideration of a “successful” sanction episode is in itself a controversial topic.  See, for instance, criticisms 
of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott’s empirical analysis (1985, 1990) by Pape (1997) and Drury (1998).  Pape is 
especially caustic in his re-evaluation of their results by arguing that only 5 of their 40 alleged successes can actually 
be labeled as such (p. 93). 
5 The counter-argument is the possibility that sanctions create the incentive for a patriotic “rally around the flag” 
effect in the target nation (Galtung 1967, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1985). 
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sacrifice for the sake of saving face internationally.6 However, if lost trade is the relevant cost measure, 
then evidence of “resolve” should decrease as lost trade (i.e. cost) increases.  Stated differently, increasing 
cost should be associated with increasing success for senders.  If it is not, then we must consider the 
possibility that the wrong estimate of cost is being used.  Sanctions episodes that do not work cannot, at 
the same time, be appropriately labeled “costly.”    
Finally, arguments which suggest that the objective of sanctions might not be to prod changes in a 
target, but rather to “serve the interests of pressure groups within the sender country” (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg 1988: 786. See also Smith 1995: 230). This view does not address the connection between the 
measured cost of sanctions and likelihood of a change in the targeted policies.  Instead, they articulate why 
nations continue to employ sanctions when a change in targeted policies is not guaranteed. 
One way to explain the increase in domestic “resolve” is to identify benefits to domestic groups 
that increase with reduced trade and offset traditionally measured GDP losses.  Selden (1999: 20-21) 
astutely points out that if sanctions can create groups of gainers, such as import-competing industries, who 
benefit from limited international competition, they can also harm the interests of group who rely on 
international supply of goods, as well as export-oriented producers.  As these groups organize, they will 
lobby key lawmakers for the end or the maintenance of the sanctions.7 For reasons that we explain below, 
groups that benefit from import-restricting sanctions will increase their political leverage and, in turn, 
decrease the likelihood of a successful sanctions episode.  On the other hand, financial sanctions are 
unlikely to lead to gainers in the recipient country and groups will organize to pressure their government to 
comply with the demands of the sender.   
                                                          
6 Drezner (1998: 711) presents an argument on resolve that is closer to our views.  According to him, states are 
concerned that concessions made in the present can be utilized later to threaten their security. Our position is that 
these fears are embedded in more general sovereignty costs that a target state perceives it must pay for its 
compliance with a sender nation. 
7 In the United States, the most powerful lobbying group in favor of scaling back sanctions is represented by 
USAengage (http://www.usaengage.org). USAengage, a group that has received the endorsement of Dick Cheney 
and Colin Powell, represents the interests of American farmers. The Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(http://www.aipac.org/) and the Cuban American National Foundation (http://www.canfnet.org/) are the most vocal 
groups supporting the continuation of sanctions. 
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Another possibility, which we explore here, is that the effectiveness of a sanction episode is 
unrelated to how we currently perceive the cost of such sanctions.  We have no contention with the claim 
that, just like any other foreign policy tool, economic sanctions are more likely to be successful if a sender 
nation can exert significant leverage on a target country. Indeed, bargaining leverage is an adequate 
measure of the value of using economic punishment to resolve disagreements among states (Morgan and 
Schwebach 1997; Drury 1998; Hart 2000). We are more dubious of the suggestion that such leverage 
should be measured in terms of pre-sanction trade linkages (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Miyagawa 
1992; Dashti-Gibson; Drury; 1998; Hart 2000) or on the basis of a nation’s economic power loss.8  
Misapprehension by policy-makers of the true cost of sanctions may explain the United States’ frequent 
use of economic coercion, but it may also provide a strong explanation for “why sanctions don’t work.” In 
part, our position is that if sanctions targets are “selected” on the basis of how a sender can hurt the trade 
prospects of a target, leaders may choose their targets on the basis of a fallacious measure of the cost of 
sanctions. 
It is a straightforward matter to identify the relevant cost facing individuals, but costs internalized 
by national governments are not nearly as obvious.  If we cling to a meaningful notion of “cost” (where an 
increase in cost leads to a decrease in demand), the task of sanctions research should be to uncover an 
appropriate measure of the cost of sanctions – one that is more consistent with empirical observation.  In 
order to identify the instrumental cost for target nations, we will begin with the premise that the relevant 
cost of sanctions is revealed by the empirical world.  Sanctions that were “costly” were more often 
successful, while sanctions that were “not costly” were less successful.  Sanctions research should 
endeavor to discover an ex ante theoretical foundation that accommodates “more costly” being 
synonymous with “more likely to succeed in exacting change”.   
                                                          
8 For instance, Pape (1997) indicates that despite facing the most extreme sanctions in history (48% of its GNP 
being eliminated by sanctions over a period of five years), Iraq has not buckled. 
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II. OVERVIEW 
 This article has two basic objectives.  First, we suggest an alternative theoretical framework for 
assessing the cost of sanctions.   Second, we propose a concrete method for measuring the cost of 
sanctions based on our alternative framework. 
In Section III, we argue that the principal-agent problem that characterizes the relationship 
between governments and their societies makes the traditional methods for estimating the cost of 
sanctions misleading in terms of anticipating a target’s policy response.  After identifying weaknesses in 
the existing paradigm, we propose an alternative theoretical framework for measuring sanctions that 
depends on the axiom that governments have a unique set of preferences centered on the desire for 
unabated sovereignty. 
 In Section IV, we propose a measure of the cost of sanctions that reflects the proposed theoretical 
framework.   In addition to accurately capturing the scope of the theory as initially defined, the functional 
form chosen extends the scope of the theory by implying unexpected and intriguing conclusions.  Finally, 
the cost model will provide a useful guide for indirect empirical tests that may ensue. 
 Using the alternative cost measure, we attempt to generate theoretically grounded insights into two 
important observations that have emerged from sanctions literature: 1) sanctions that are imposed quickly 
are relatively more effective than sanctions that are imposed slowly, and 2) financial sanctions are more 
effective than trade sanctions in terms of exacting changes in target policy.  More interestingly, our 
alternative measure of sanctions costs lead us to believe that sanctions are more likely to work when used 
against a developed economic power than against a developing country.  This may provide an indication 
of ‘why sanctions don’t work’ given that such sanctions are traditionally imposed on small economic 
powers.9 
                                                          
9 From our account of sanction episodes indexed in Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) for the period 1914-1989, 
only 16.5% of all cases (18 out of 109) are imposed on developed economies.  In a recent study updating their 
original data, Elliott and Hufbauer (1999: 405) indicate that only 11% (6 out of 56) of sanctions during the 1990’s 
were targeting European countries.  None of them were imposed on North American states.  Another source 
indicates that unilateral American economic sanctions target more than 75 of the world’s nearly 200 countries, with 
only a handful targets being highly industrialized countries (Canada, Italy, Japan and Taiwan. See USA Engage 
2000). Furthermore, the current targets of the most comprehensive American unilateral sanctions under the Trading 
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III. RATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF NATIONS 
“There is neither logical reason nor historical evidence that political or 
psychological collapse inevitably follows economic hardship.” (Porter, 
1979: 581) 
 
 Traditionally, the cost of a sanctions episode has been estimated as lost trade, as illustrated in 
Figure 1 (Pape 1997: 96).  There are a variety of sound reasons for using this measure when studying 
sanctions.  First, lost trade constitutes a reduction in social welfare for a target nation, and therefore is 
appropriately viewed as the cost incurred by society.  In addition, lost trade is tractable – easily 
identifiable and easily measured (relatively speaking).  Finally, there are no immediately apparent 
alternatives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditional 
Measure of the 
Cost of Sanctions
Figure 1: Traditional Measure of the Cost of Sanctions 
 
Traditionally, the cost of sanctions is measured as the reduction in GDP following the imposition of 
sanctions.  It is analogous to foregone gains from possible trade opportunities.   
 
                                 Autarky                                         Sanctions                  Full-Trade                  GDP 
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with the Enemies Act or the International Economic Emergency Powers Act are all from the developing world: 
Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Angola. 
  
However, the shortcomings in aggregate measures of lost trade for the purpose of understanding sanctions 
have been recognized in previous studies.  Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff point out that their 
“analysis suggests that an appreciation of both the problems and promise of economic sanctions requires a 
more sophisticated understanding of the cost that sanctions impose.” (1997: 616) 
One problem with our comprehension of the cost of sanctions as it exists today is that it is an 
application of consumer rationalism to government decision-makers.  In effect, this approach suggests 
that when faced with sanctions government decision-makers perfectly reflect the aggregate interests of 
society, and seek primarily to maximize national economic welfare.10  Although one would hope that 
governments behave with these goals in mind, there is ample evidence to believe otherwise.  If authorities 
were only interested in maximizing economic welfare, then there would be no barriers to trade.  
(Furthermore, income taxes would be the only form of government taxation and individual subsidies 
would be of the block-grant/cash form).  In the current era of increasingly unfettered international trade, it 
is also easy to forget that the vast majority of government actions still serve to reinforce or enhance the 
integrity of national boundaries and domestic sovereignty at the expense of economic gain.  The 
exceptions are noteworthy, and can be itemized quite neatly during the evening news. Hence, a better way 
to conceptualize the impact of sanctions is to think about how they affect directly or indirectly the 
political elite in a target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Alerassool 1993; Morgan and 
Schwebach 1995; Smith 1995; Dasti-Gibson et al. 1997). 
Public choice theorists have attempted to address this problem by incorporating state-level 
interest groups into the decision-making process of target nations (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988).   
However, in so doing, they seem to suggest that the foreign policy choices of target governments are 
largely an epiphenomenon of the distribution of the costs of sanctions and interest group pressure: “State 
                                                          
10 Economists have perhaps been the most egregious in their failure to recognize this principle-agent relationship, 
and have generally ignored the possibility that anything other than maximization of social welfare is at issue with 
trade.  The entirety of international economics analysis depends on changes in social welfare realized through trade.  
In the area of sanctions, an enormous volume of economics research published during the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s following the oil crisis used lost GDP, lost trade, and lost social welfare in attempts to quantify the impact of 
sanctions and to proscribe policy choices under the threat of sanctions.  
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Policy – including foreign economic policy – is therefore comprehensible only if viewed as the 
consequence of competing influences exerted by interest groups” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1990: 180). 
This tells part of the story. Yet, it also appears to trivialize the power of national leaders to an extent that 
contradicts intuition, especially with respect to foreign policy decisions.   Although officials everywhere 
must answer to the demands of various domestic actors, it seems excessive to create a model that 
relegates government to handmaiden of special interests. 
As an alternative to traditional measures, in this article we propose a model of cost that is based 
on the hypothesis that the most fundamental goal of any government is the desire to exercise control and 
demonstrate or reinforce its position of self-rule, and that in the international arena other government 
objectives are secondary.11   This cost assessment views national governments as unitary actors pursuing 
their own, narrow interests when faced with sanctions – namely, self-perpetuation and validation - 
through their international status as sovereign with respect to internal policy matters.  Therefore, while 
not being categorically opposed to marginal improvements in the well being of citizens, a government 
would, ex ante, enter into trade only if it believes trade will not interfere with their legitimacy as 
sovereign.  If forced to choose between sovereignty and additional social welfare through trade, the 
government will choose sovereignty.12  This hypothesis is consistent with the observation by Willett and 
Jalalighajar that “increased cost to the target government of continuing its policies seldom outweighs the 
political cost of appearing to give in to foreign influences” (1983: 724).13 In our view, for government 
leaders, the decision to enter into trade (subsequently referred to as the “entry decision”) requires that the 
gains from trade be an economic “windfall”. 
Critically, we feel it is important to point out that states may initiate policy changes to facilitate 
trade; but changes, as such, do not constitute a loss of sovereignty.  Sovereignty is not a necessarily a 
                                                          
11 Much in the same way that physical safety is the “highest” goal of an individual, and that it must be met before 
any others can be pursued.   
12 This argument assumes autarkic self-sufficiency, which can be considered a very minimal requirement. Citizens, 
furthermore, are sympathetic to the primacy of sovereignty as a goal.  The "rally-around-the flag" effect could be 
interpreted as evidence that citizens are also willing to forgo additional consumption in order to “consume” national 
sovereignty. 
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function of the circumstances that prompt change, the nature of policy changes initiated, or the extent to 
which policy changes are consistent with the preferences of second-parties.  Rather, any policy action can 
be consistent with sovereignty if it is entered into willing and without coercion.  It is simply the difference 
between willing contracts and extortion, a distinction which is generally familiar and well-accepted at the 
level of individual actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Alternative Cost of Sanctions 
 
The imposition of sanctions puts the target nation at point t1.  Over time, the target adjusts its resources 
out of export-oriented industries and back into former import industries.  The cost of sanctions under the 
alternative proposed here would be lost output in the former import industries during the re-adjustment 
period.  The total cost is cumulative (Total Cost = 1+2+3+4), with declining incremental costs as the target 
re-adjusts internal resources (1>2>3>4).
 
 
 
                               
 
3
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1
4
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t1     t2     t3       t4             t5                                        Full Trade                  GDP 
 
 
For a nation that commits to trade and is subsequently threatened with sanctions, the trade 
contract has changed from one in which the economic gain is a “windfall” to one in which gains from 
trade must be exchanged for sovereignty.  Having an absolute preference for sovereignty, the nation’s 
highest preference would be to exit the trade contract and exchange the gains from trade for the 
sovereignty that it finds more valuable.14    However, in the same way that firms face exit costs because 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Pape adopts similar views: “Pervasive nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable 
punishment rather than abandon what are seen as the interests of the nation” (1997: 93). 
14 The preference for exit assumes that the nation faces one dichotomous choice: resist (exit) and endure sanctions, 
or acquiesce.  This view is compatible with the notion that “even high economic costs can be outweighed by 
political benefits” (Simon 1995: 214). 
  9 
  
resources and obligations are fixed in the short-run, the “exit decision” is not entirely free. Following the 
cessation of trade, market disequilibria will exist in the target nation as internal resources are shifted away 
from export-led industries and into former import-competing industries.15  This reallocation process 
constitutes a negative payoff stemming from the decision to trade, since reallocation would not have been 
necessary if the government had chosen to rely on its own productive capacity.16 The diminished ability to 
meet internal needs in a coercive international relations environment constitutes the risk of trade (See 
Figure 2).  When facing sanctions, the trade risk is incurred and becomes an exit cost.  As with firms, exit 
costs for trading nations will differ depending on the flexibility of resources and the level of losses that 
are incurred while resources are inefficiently employed.  In the event of sanctions, the target government 
will weigh the cost of adjusting internal resources (the exit cost) against the sovereign value of the policy 
in question, and will resist sanctions if the cost of adjustment is less than the value of the policy and 
acquiesce to sanctions if the cost of adjustment exceeds the value of the policy. The instrumental cost of 
sanctions using this analysis is foregone autarkic production during the re-establishment of sovereignty – 
and not lost trade. 
This formulation of the rationalism of nations may explain why, as cited earlier, threats from 
repeat sanctioner lack credibility.  Vulnerable trading partners may know when engaged in trade with 
such countries that the benefits are not a “windfall” and insulate themselves against potential costs of 
                                                          
15 Selden adopts the traditional notion of trade dependence to evaluate the impact of economic coercion (1999:3), 
but makes the important distinction between export sanctions (those that block or slow the flow of goods to a target 
state) and import sanctions (those that block or slow the flow of goods from a target state).  This distinction is 
important because export sanctions have a function that is equivalent to a protective tariff for those producers 
capable of supplying a substitute (1999:4). Import sanctions are deemed potentially more effective because they 
don’t provide such benefits to producers of substitute goods. Since Selden is interested in constructing a model that 
explains why some sanctions don’t work, he does not account for import sanctions.  That constitutes where his 
model differs greatly from ours.  By concentrating on reallocation of resources towards a situation of autarky or 
semi-autarky, we consider the possibility that not only producers of embargoed and substitute goods may be 
advantaged by the imposition of sanctions, but also that some of the forsaken resources will spill over to import-
competing industries. 
16 The trade “gamble”: a government engages in trade where the expected value = (probability of no interference x 
the value of trade) – (probability of interference x the opportunity cost of trade), where the opportunity cost of trade 
is the goods/services that could have been produced internally but weren’t.  The European Union is engaged in a 
very high-risk gamble in this regard, and members appear to believe that the economic benefits of an integrated 
market will outweigh the potential costs (with low probability attached to “catastrophic” outcomes) associated with 
lost political autonomy. One could also make a similar argument in regards to China’s decision to join the World 
Trade Organization. 
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interrupted trade through measures that support domestic producers, essentially maintaining a ready 
platform for ramping up production if necessary, or by maintaining multiple source channels at the 
expense of maximum social welfare.  In fact, just about every nation with the means to do so follows such 
a policy with regard to agriculture, with the whole-hearted support of citizenry, in spite of the obvious 
long-term economic benefits that could be realized from less protected markets. 
One of the unintended consequences of sanctions is that gradually create a protected market for 
domestic producers of import substitutes. This insulation from foreign competition encourages rent-
seeking behavior by the protected industries that have a strong preference for upholding the sanctions.  
This course of action is similar to domestic rent-seeking created by external tariffs (Rogowski 1989; Alt 
and Gilligan 2000).17 The aggregate economic impact of the sanctions on society are more than likely 
negative, but according to the logic of collective action (Olson 1971) a relatively small group that gains 
from economic isolation have some advantages over a much larger group of consumers. Smaller groups 
are easier to organize and can more easily solve the free rider problem. More fundamentally, smallness 
provides greater personal incentives through higher returns to individual members. The costs created by 
an inefficient allocation of resources are passed on to the entire society.   Interestingly, as society adjusts 
over time to its semi-autarkic level of production aggregate welfare increases, the benefits of which 
accrue to the entire population.   Under these circumstances, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, 
citizens in the target country would be increasingly satisfied with the performance of their government.  
Consequently, sanctions that endure long enough for such adjustment to take place are unlikely to be 
ended at the satisfaction of the sender country. 
Under this formulation, government officials would work to maximize the productive efficiency 
of internal resources for every particular level of international trade.  "Costs" from sanctions are only 
incurred to the extent that they cause deviation from the efficient allocation at the new, lower level of 
trade. Deviations occur when a government has chosen to trade (under the belief that its sovereignty 
                                                          
17 Alt and Gilligan (2000) contrast Rogowski’s (1989) factor-based approach (Stolper and Samuelson 1941) to 
political coalitions with a sectoral (or “specific factors”) approach drawn from Richardo-Viner model of 
international trade.  
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would remain intact) but shouldn’t have.18  The deviations will be larger (i.e. more costly) for societies 
that chose to import scarce resources, for societies that engage in large absolute levels of trade, and for 
societies who have high labor and capital productivity. 
To restate, the sovereign state would order its preferences as follows: 
1) Uninterrupted trade and continued political autonomy (vis-à-vis the public policy in 
question.) 
2) Ending (or reducing) trade without costs and continued political autonomy (vis-à-vis the 
public policy in question.) [Note that using the traditional measures a reduction in trade is 
inconsistent with being “costless”.] 
3) Ending (or reducing) trade at an exit cost that is lower than the value of the policy. 
4) Acquiescing to sanctions. 
If the cost of adjustment to the lower level of trade is expected to exceed the value of the policy, 
the policy is abandoned and the target acquiesces to sanctions.  If the cost of adjusting back to autarkic 
production or the new, lower level of trade are not excessive (not greater than the value of the policy) then 
the nation rebuffs the threat of sanctions.  Under these circumstances, the target will simply adjust its 
internal economy to the lower level of trade.   
 
 
                                                          
18 Selden takes our argument one step further when implying that  
“in the long run, sanctions can actually aid in the development of domestic industries capable of 
satisfying national needs, reducing the target’s economic interdependence with the rest of the 
world and, in turn, the ability of other nations or international organizations to influence the 
target’s behavior through economic channels. Therefore, not only can the imposition of sanctions 
fail to produce the desired short-term effects, they may also have serious long-term consequences” 
(Our emphasis, 1999: 15). 
Galtung (1967) also contends that sanctions can be counterproductive by generating new elite that benefit from 
international isolation. 
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IV. MODEL OF SOVEREIGN COST 
Sovereign Cost Index = ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
=
−+−
N
t
kmtlmt aKKKaLLL
0
~/~~/~∑  
Where: 1−∗= tt LL α                1−∗= tt KK β         
L
TL
l a
aa =   
 
  
)(
1
~ SrTrive
tL
L
−−



=
−
α         
)(
1
~ SrTriwe
tK
K
−−



=
−
β
 
        
K
Tk
k a
a
a =   
 
  L~ = Autarkic allocation of labor in sanctioned industry. 
 K~ = Autarkic allocation of capital in sanctioned industry. 
  v, w = structural mobility of labor, capital 
  i = structural development of financial markets 
  Target labor productivity  =TLa
  Target capital productivity =TKa
 =LK aa ,  World average capital and labor productivity  
 
 The above equation represents an index of the cost of sanctions, where cost is measured as the 
deviation of resources from the autarkic optimal allocation following the imposition of sanctions.  The 
variables  and   scale the cost index upward or downward based on the target’s relative 
productivity, for reasons explained shortly.  The cost index increases over time until the target’s economy 
has adjusted back to autarky, while the speed of adjustment, and therefore the cost of sanctions measured 
using the cost index, depends on the adjustment factors 
TLa TKa
α  and β .    The “ideal” adjustment values, 
representing complete adjustment to autarky, during any given adjustment period, t, equal the ratios 
1
~
−tL
L  
and
1
~
−tK
K .  The actual adjustment values will be reduced by an amount determined by the structural 
mobility of labor, capital, and financial resources (v, w, i) and the liquidity of financial resources as 
measured by the change in interest rates following the imposition of sanctions( )sT rr − . 
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A.  Deviation of Resources from Autarkic Optimum 
 In the above equation, the deviation of resources from the optimum autarkic allocation is captured 
by the expressions [ ]LLL t ~/)~( −  and [( ]~/)~ KKK t− , where Lt and Kt represent the levels of labor and 
capital in the targeted industry at time t, and L~ and K~  represent the (fixed) levels of labor and capital 
devoted to the target industry in autarkic equilibrium.  The deviation ratio will be highest at t  and will 
decrease as  and increase as t , until 
0=
tL tK →∝ tLL =~  and tKK =~ , at which point the target nation can 
be considered to have regained internal efficiency (and possibly but not necessarily self-sufficiency) in the 
sanctioned industry.  (The rate by which  and increase will be explained shortly.) tL tK
 
Figure 3:  Sub-Optimal Allocation of Resources Following Sanctions 
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 In an international goods market, an individual trading nation takes the world price, Pw.  
Consumers in the target nation consume QFT at this price, of which QS is produced domestically 
(determined by the domestic supply curve, SH) and the remainder (QFT - QS) is imported (determined by 
international supply curve, SH+F).  Upon the imposition of sanctions, the goods market is no longer in 
equilibrium.  The cost of sanctions in this case is the misallocation of resources evidenced by the supply 
shortage (QA - QS), which is optimal domestic production under autarky minus post-sanctions domestic 
production.   
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The extent of deviation from autarkic optimum at 0=t depends on several things.  Figure 3 
explains the basic logic of the potential misallocation of resources following the imposition of sanctions, 
but further explanation is necessary.  First and foremost, it should be pointed out that if the target is able 
to redirect trade toward other nations, then there may be little misallocation.  Such changes in trade 
patterns are consistent with the idea of mis-selection by senders, in that costly sanctions imposed are not 
necessarily costly sanctions incurred.  Further, if we assume that the target was pursuing the most 
economically beneficial (and therefore efficient) trade relationship prior to the onset of sanctions.  (Such 
trade opportunities will inevitably have been present, if latent, prior to sanctions, but untapped in favor of 
trade with the sanctioner.) We may also surmise that the re-directed trade will make the nation marginally 
worse off, which implicitly speaks to the targets’ readiness to forego economic welfare in order to avoid 
coercion and protect sovereignty. 
Therefore, to the extent that the target’s trade volumes and patterns are actually interrupted, 
there are several variables which will determine the resulting resource misallocation.  First, the more 
scarce or specialized the sanctioned items the higher the initial misallocation.  Second, the higher is the 
demand for the sanctioned good(s), the higher is the deviation from optimum autarkic allocation. Third, a 
higher ratio of imports to total demand will also lead to higher initial misallocations.  Finally, although 
the cost index does not capture this effect directly, the sanctioning of intermediate goods will lead to a 
higher deviation of resources than the sanctioning of consumer goods by disrupting production, and 
therefore adjustment to autarky, in multiple goods markets. 
1)  The deviation from autarkic optimum will be greater for the import of "scarce” resources.   
 
One of the intriguing conundrums facing policy markets and international economists since the 
oil embargo of the 1970s and 80's is the problem of coming to depend on the importation of a scarce 
resource. Because it is difficult to mobilize the resources needed to regain self-sufficiency in the 
production of scarce items, a nation facing the threat of sanctions must weigh the immediate benefits of 
increased social welfare (through trade) against the possible long-term costs of a sudden reduction in 
supply.  In keeping with the theory underlying the model of cost proposed here, the solution 
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recommended by economists has been to maintain a moderate level of internal production in spite of 
potential gains from trade.  Fundamentally, this is a strategy of “semi-autarky”, reflecting the fact that for 
scarce resources the opportunity cost of engaging in full trade is high.  This is, in fact, the key to the 
theory of the sovereign cost of trade.  In an international environment where sanctions are used, engaging 
in trade in order to increase current consumption requires a nation to forgo what it would be able to 
produce itself.  Thus, specializing out of the production of highly scarce or critical goods leads to a 
potentially high sovereign cost in the event of sanctions because internal production cannot be quickly 
and easily resumed.  Policies of semi-autarky reveal that for some goods the sovereign cost of trade is too 
high, irrespective of the potential gains from trade.  
 Within the model of sovereign cost, this problem is captured as a large deviation from the 
autarkic allocation of resources.  If an industrialized nation were required to meet its own (inelastic) 
demand for energy, for instance, a comparatively large amount of labor and capital inputs would be 
required in the short run to compensate for each small reduction in imported oil (See Figure 4).  For 
scarce resources such as energy, part of the deviation in resources would be attributable not to lost 
production of the sanctioned item, but lost production of substitutes, because in autarky an economy 
naturally shifts out of the production of goods that have inelastic supply through innovation and 
substitution (See Figure 5 below).19 By engaging in trade a nation diverts resources from the lengthy 
substitution process and, in the event of sanctions, incurs large short-run costs.  For instance, it took 
nearly a decade for the United States and other dependent nations to begin using alternative sources of 
fuels following the oil crisis. 
                                                          
19 Interestingly, the existence of a “black knight” providing assistance to a target nation (Hufbauer, Schott, and 
Elliott 1985; Drury 1998) can only provide short-term relief and affect long-term productivity by preventing difficult 
political decisions related to the development of substitute goods and the support for innovative production 
techniques. 
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Figure 4:  Inelastic Domestic Supply and the Cost of Sanctions 
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 For a given increase in production, Y1  - Y0, a good characterized by inelastic supply requires a substantial 
increase in labor allocation relative to a good characterized by elastic supply.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Lost Innovation and the Cost of Sanctions 
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The sanctioning of scarce products leads to high 
levels of lost production in the short run (QA' - 
QS).  In autarky, substitution would have led to a 
decrease in demand for the sanctioned item 
(represented by the long run demand curve, LRD) 
and a lower quantity demanded (QA).  The 
sovereign cost of sanctions should capture the 
lost opportunity for innovation and substitution, 
and can be approximated by measuring deviation 
of resources under the assumption that demand 
does not shift from the import industry (i.e. use 
QA' instead of QA in order to measure the cost of 
sanctions). 
                                                          
21 Productivity here is used in the strict economic sense: output per unit of labor or capital input. 
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2)  Ceteris paribus, the deviation below optimal resource allocation, measured as a percentage of 
optimal, will be lower for the sanctioning of goods for which there is high demand.   
 
 Figure 6 demonstrates the peculiarity of this result.  It shows that for a particular import (i.e. for a 
particular supply schedule), irrespective of the level of demand, sanctions lead to identical reductions in 
supply (compare AB to A' B').  However, because production functions are characterized by declining 
marginal productivity, the absolute level of resource misallocation will be higher for the high-demand 
schedule.  Also because of declining marginal productivity, resource misallocation will be a smaller 
percentage of optimal for the high-demand schedule, suggesting that even though it leads to higher levels 
of resource misallocation the sovereign cost index, as constructed, will assign it a lower value. 
It is not clear whether this mathematical effect on the cost index is consistent with the theory 
underlying the creation of the sovereign cost index, nor is it apparent whether the effect is consistent with 
empirical evidence.   However, the question will need to be explored because the effect of the level of 
demand on the cost of sanctions and the proposed cost index is more than trivial.  An effective theory 
should be able to generalize the effect of sanctions on a nation based on population and total GNP.  Since 
a nation’s overall level of demand for goods and services depends on these structural features, a 
comprehensive theory must incorporate the effect of the level of demand.  It will also be instructive to 
compare the effect of sanctions on rich versus poor nations through the effect of wealth, elasticity of 
demand, and post-sanctions levels of demand.  In fact, theoretically, the total cost of a sanction episode 
can turn critically on whether or not the sanctioned items are “necessities” or “luxuries” (See Figure 7).  
By definition, necessities are items that have low income-elasticity, while luxuries have high income-
elasticity.  For necessities, we can expect relatively high initial deviation of resources in both rich and 
poor countries, reflecting the fact that if supply is suspended demand will nevertheless remain largely 
unchanged.  In other words, demand for the sanctioned item is price inelastic, and the autarkic 
equilibrium level of consumption will be close to the level of pre-sanctions consumption.    
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Figure 6: High Demand and the Cost of Sanctions 
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Because SH+ F is parallel to SH and DHigh is parallel to DLow, A' B' = AB and B' C' = BC, meaning that as a 
percentage of optimal autarkic quantity, the quantity produced immediately following the imposition of 
sanctions is the same for high as for low levels of demand.   Because production functions are typically 
downward sloping, the absolute deviation of resources will nevertheless be higher for the high demand 
curve, while the percentage below optimal will be lower.   
 
Figure 7: Elasticity of Demand and Post-Sanctions Misallocation 
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Two countries are represented in the above graphs. The one on the left is characterized by elastic 
demand for the sanctioned item, while the one on the right has inelastic demand for the sanctioned item.  
During full trade, both produce QS and import QFT - QS.  Although both are producing the same quantity 
immediately following the imposition of sanctions, QS, the nation on the right has a higher deviation from 
autarkic optimum because the autarkic quantity demanded is close to the pre-sanctions level of total 
demand.   
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 However, the elasticity of demand for a good or service might change with the overall wealth of a 
nation’s consumers.  Specifically, a single item might be considered a necessity in a wealthy country yet a 
luxury in a poor country.   If this is the case, the sanctioning of goods to wealthy countries should be more 
costly because, ceteris paribus, wealthy countries are more likely to have inelastic demand (See Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Increasing Inelasticity of Demand with Increasing Wealth 
Price 
   D4 
   D3 
D2 
 
       D1 
 
 
     Quantity 
At left, the four hypothetical curves are 
drawn to show the way demand might shift 
as a nation’ s wealth increases.  Each curve 
represents demand at a particular level of 
wealth.  As wealth increases, the slope of 
the curve increases, showing increasing 
inelasticity of demand.  Using a “ unit”  
change in price, represented by the two 
horizontal lines, note the difference in the 
change in quantity demanded across the 
demand curves.  Empirical research should 
reveal whether or not this is an accurate 
representation of the nature of demand. 
 
 
3) The sanctioning of widely used intermediate inputs will lead to higher initial deviation of resources 
from autarkic optimum than the sanctioning of consumption goods. 
 
 This observation recognizes the notion that sanctioning intermediate goods used in a wide variety 
of applications necessitates adjustment in multiple markets.   In terms of calculating the actual cost of 
sanctions, traditional measures would capture the dollar value of disrupted supply.  The alternative 
proposed here would not measure the value of lost imports, but should measure lost internal production of 
the sanctioned item and the lost internal production of goods requiring the sanctioned item as an input.  In 
a general sense, sanctioning goods with a large, inelastic post-sanctions market demand increases the 
sovereign cost of sanctions.  One way to accomplish this is to sanction items that are used in a wide 
variety of production processes as well as at the level of individual consumption. 
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B. Target Productivity in the Sanctioned Industry 
 
 After deciding to engage in trade, we have suggested that a nation threatened with sanctions will 
calculate the cost of sanctions based on the production they could achieve if they return to autarky.  When 
deciding whether or not to acquiesce to sanctions, the target considers the cost of the transition back to 
self-sufficiency based on their own lost productive capacity, and not the loss of imports.  In the model of 
sovereign cost, the terms and  are indexes of productivity relative to average world productivity.21  
The values of and  are calculated as the ratio of the targeted nation's labor and capital productivity 
relative to average world productivities.  
lma kma
lma kma
Because productivity plays an important role in the shape of a supply curve, we should point out that 
in this article we are drawing a distinction between elasticity of supply and productivity.  Elasticity of 
supply, discussed earlier, can be viewed as goods that require a proportionally large increase in inputs for 
a given increase in production, holding the productivity of labor and capital constant.  Productivity refers 
to the overall marginal productivity of labor and capital as these differ across nations, not across different 
goods or services.   
The model suggests the following regularities with respect to the target productivity and the cost of 
sanctions. 
1)  For any given deviation from optimum, over a fixed amount of time at a given rate of adjustment, 
 nations characterized by high productivity will face higher "sovereign cost" than low-productivity 
nations 
 
This is perhaps the most surprising implication of the cost formula, as it is starkly counter-
intuitive based on the conventional wisdom.  Typically, industrialized nations are expected to be 
relatively immune from sanctions since any given sanctions episode would reduce trade by an apparently 
inconsequential amount.  However, we have hypothesized that a nation determines whether or not to 
acquiesce to sanctions by considering how costly it would be to adjust back to autarky in terms of its own 
ability to produce the imported item.  Highly productive nations could have been producing more if they 
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had remained in autarky; therefore, the cost of sanctions is higher.  In other words, the opportunity cost of 
choosing to trade is higher for a highly productive country.  
 
Figure 9: Productivity and the Cost of Trade Sanctions 
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 In the Figure 9 above, Mexico’s production function, with a steeper slope, suggests lower 
productivity.  Prior to sanctions, both the United States and Mexico produce the same amount 
domestically (QS) and import the same amount from the world market (QD - QS).  Following sanctions, 
before domestic resources are adjusted to the new closed market, the United States loses more social 
welfare than Mexico because of its higher productivity level.   
During the period immediately following the imposition of sanctions, social welfare for Mexico is 
the area (ACFKL).  Had Mexico never chosen to trade, social welfare during the same period would have 
been (ACFKL BDG).  Thus, it loses social welfare represented by areas BDG during the initial period of  
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Figure 9: Productivity and the Cost of Trade Sanctions 
Social Welfare = [Consumer Surplus]+[Producer Surplus] 
 
Prior to sanctions (free trade): 
 
Mexico’s SW = [ACF  BDG  EHI  J] + [K L] 
United States’ SW  = [ACF  BDG  EHI  J] + [K ] 
 
Following sanctions, the first period cost of sanctions is 
social welfare at optimal autarkic production minus social 
elfare at sub-optimal (post-sanctions) production: w
 
CostMexico= B + D + G 
Costu.s.= B + D + G + E + H + I 
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adjustment.  As price increases reflecting the sudden shortage of supply, producers move into the 
sanctioned market, moving up the supply curve.  During each period of this adjustment process, social 
welfare loss is between BDG (maximum loss following sanctions) and zero (when production reaches the 
level QAMexico). 
 For the United States, social welfare following the imposition of sanctions is (ACFK).  Had the 
US never engaged in trade, social welfare would have been (ACFK BDG EHI).   Therefore, because 
sanctions were imposed, the decision to trade costs the United States social welfare of (BDG EHI).  This 
adjustment loss can be avoided, but only at the expense of ceding sovereignty to the foreign aggressor.   
Considering this in terms of trade theory, it is widely recognized that opportunities for trade exist 
through comparative advantage even when one nation enjoys an absolute advantage for all goods.  Thus, 
both highly and less productive nations will engage in trade to increase social welfare.   However, highly 
productive nations have the capacity for higher absolute levels of autarkic production, meaning that for 
these nations the opportunity cost of trade in terms of forgone production is higher.  
 This is slightly different than the impact of wealth on the elasticity of demand discussed above.  
Ceteris paribus, market demand for normal goods will be higher in wealthy nations than in poor nations, 
suggesting that after sanctions more resources will need to be shifted into the affected industry.  However, 
a highly productive nation loses more in terms of output during every period of adjustment – for any 
given level of resource misallocation (that is, holding market demand constant).   
 As an illustration of this nuance, consider two car/driver pairs: one car is able to travel at a 
constant speed of 45 miles per hour (low productivity) while the other drives at a constant speed of 65 
miles per hour (high productivity).  Holding the demand for car travel constant (market demand for 
distance), it should be apparent that for every hour the slow car can't be driven (i.e. the car resource has 
not “adjusted” to autarky), the driver loses 45 miles of travel, while the driver of the fast car loses 65 
miles of distance for the same misallocation. 
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2) High-productivity nations will be likely to find the embargo of labor-intensive goods as costly as 
capital-intensive goods.  Conversely, the cost of sanctions in capital-intensive goods would likely be 
low for low-productivity countries.   
 
We learn from traditional trade theory that countries with a comparative advantage in producing 
capital-intensive goods will export these and import labor-intensive goods (Heckscher and Ohlin 1991).  
Conversely, countries with a comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive goods will export these 
and import capital-intensive items.   What is important is relative advantage.  However, under the theory 
of sovereign cost it is also important to consider absolute advantage.   
Typically, the countries that export capital-intensive goods do so because they possess a larger 
asset base, better education, and advanced technological development relative to poor countries.  This is 
not to say, however, that their labor is not productive in an absolute sense.  Rather, they have high 
productivity in both labor and capital, but have a relative advantage in capital-intensive goods because of 
generations of investment.  On the other hand, countries that export labor-intensive goods do so because 
they have an abundance of low-skilled labor that can be employed at very low cost.  Typically, a poor 
country's ability to produce capital-intensive goods is low by both relative and absolute measures.   
When the decision to trade is viewed as the foregone opportunity to maximize one’s autarkic 
production, relatively speaking a low-productivity country has not given up much when they engage in 
trade for goods they might not otherwise be able to produce.   The opportunity cost of trade (lost 
production of capital intensive goods) is low.  Wealthy nations such as the United States, in contrast, have 
the capacity to meet their internal need for labor-intensive goods.  Therefore, the opportunity cost of 
engaging in trade is much higher. 
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C.  Speed of Adjustment to Autarky 
 Over time, we can expect a sanctions target to adjust its resources away from the pre-sanctions 
export industries and into the pre-sanctions import industries until the allocations reach the optimum 
levels, .22  In the above cost model, increases in every period by an adjustment factor KL ~,~ tL tα , where 
( ) 1~1~ −−−−= trrivett LLα .23  When 1=1~ −−− trrive , ( )1~ −= tt LLα  and LLLLL ttt ~
~
1
1
=


= −
−
, meaning that in 
time (i.e. within one time period) labor allocation increases to the optimum level.  Since 0t 1≤≤ v  and 
10
~ ≤≤ − trr−ie , tα will tend to be less than is necessary for full adjustment; specifically, 
( )1~1 −≤≤ tLLtα .  At the opposite extreme, when 1=tα  then ( ) 111 −− == ttt LLL , meaning that the 
amount of labor in the previously imported sector has not increased since the previous period. During 
every period of adjustment, tα will fall somewhere between these two extremes. 
 How fast L increases, and by extension the speed with which t ( ) 0~ →− tLL , depends on the 
adjustment factor, which is equal to its maximum (or ideal) value, ( )1~ −tLL=tα , reduced by a fraction 
less than one: ve .24   The term (rS - rFT) measures the change in interest rates before and after 
sanctions are imposed and reflects the availability of financial capital in the target’s economy while the 
structural liquidity factor, i , measures the level of financial market development in the target economy, 
and will be a value greater than one.   For instance, suppose (rS - rFT) = .50 , indicating that interest rates 
increased by .50% after sanctions.  If 
( FTr− )Sri− (
1=i  and 1=v , then ( )50 = e 61.50. =−.−ive  and ( )61.1~ −= tt LLα .  
However, if i  then and 5.1= 47.)50)50(. ===−ve i 75.−e)(.5.1(−e ( )47.1~ −= tt LLα .  As financial market 
                                                          
22 Our formal demonstration differs from Renwick’s (1981: 81) claim that sanctions don’t work because they take 
too long to take effect, thereby allowing recipients enough time to find alternative markets and substitute goods 
before they bear the full weight of boycotts and embargoes.  While Renwick proposes a reason why “sanctions don’t 
work,” we introduce a formal model that shows under which conditions sanctions may or may not succeed. 
23 We will only explain the adjustment of labor in detail, since physical capital adjustment follows the same process. 
24 For now, we will assign a range of fixed values for v  and assume 1=i , because proxy measures for these 
variables are not immediately evident.   
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development declines, the adjustment factor, α , approaches 1 and the time required for the target to 
regain equilibrium increases.   
The structural mobility of labor is measured by the value , such that mobility is greatest when 
 and lowest when v .  A nation’s labor mobility will depend on education levels, labor market 
demand and supply conditions and transportation infrastructure, among other things.  Although structural 
features of labor supply are important, it is important to note here that even when  (perfect labor 
mobility) 
v
1=v 0=
1=v
( )1~ −≠ tt LLα ; a nation’s ability to mobilize labor resources depends not only on 
characteristics of the labor markets, but also on access to efficient financial markets. 
This formalization of the speed of adjustment back to autarky leads to the following propositions. 
1)  Sanctions that are imposed quickly will be more costly than sanctions that achieve the same 
 ultimate level of trade retraction but are imposed slowly. 
 
Sanctions that are imposed slowly lead to minimal resource dislocation and therefore facilitate 
low-cost (i.e. rapid) adjustment to the new, lower level of trade.  More importantly, slowly applied 
sanctions might not produce costs that exceed the critical threshold while sanctions that are applied 
quickly and achieve the same level of trade retraction might lead to costs that exceed the critical 
threshold.  This is consistent with empirical observations that “drawn-out” sanctions have lower 
probabilities of sender success.25   
 
2)  A nation that is able to adjust its resource allocation quickly will be relatively “immune” to 
sanctions; conversely, rigidities in the labor and physical capital markets will make sanctions more 
costly. 
 
 Perhaps the most intuitively productive insight resulting from this analysis is the idea that 
sovereign nations are less concerned with lost welfare from reduced trade (the traditional measure of the 
                                                          
25 Others suggest the passage of time may harden the resolve of the target (Miyagawa 1992; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 
2000) or “crack” the solidarity of international coalitions imposing the sanctions (Nincic and Wallensteen 1983; 
Martin 1992).  As mentioned earlier in the paper, these explanations speak to the success or failure of sanctions 
episodes, generally, but do not address the relationship of cost to success.  Another interpretation of the failure of 
long drawn sanctions to exact change in a target comes from Leyton Brown’s (1987) suggestion that senders are 
reluctant to abandon their economic coercion after recognizing their fiasco.  Conversely, those who clasp to the 
traditional notion of the cost of sanctions affirm that costs are cumulative and that the longer the sanctions are in 
effect the most likely they are to succeed (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Brady 1987).   
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cost of sanctions) and more concerned with getting back on their own two autarkic feet.   Barriers to the 
mobilization of labor and capital will increase the time needed to adjust internal production, and therefore 
increase the cost of sanctions.  In addition to traditional economic measures of labor and capital mobility, 
it might also be useful to examine sociopolitical elements of ownership and control that inhibit or 
promote the rapid movement of resources.  For instance, are highly regulated countries or autocratic 
governments able to respond quickly because of centralized decision-making, or does government control 
lead to political patronage and the resistance to change? If democratic leaders were motivated primarily 
by the prospect of reelection, would they disrupt the structural adjustment back to “semi-autarky?” If the 
answer to the previous question is no, we would consequently expect democratic targets to comply with 
senders’ economic pressure more often than autocratic regimes.26  We are not aware of any studies that 
test empirically for the impact of state labor or financial regulation on a target’s ability to resist economic 
sanctions, but we found at least two statistical analyses that reach the conclusion that sanctions against 
democracies are more likely to succeed (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Nooruddin 2002).27 
 
3)  Rigidity in financial markets, or a lack of access to financial capital, slows the adjustment of labor 
and capital allocation, and makes sanctions more costly. 
 This observation may help to explain why Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1985) found financial 
sanctions to be more effective in prompting policy change than trade sanctions (See also Alerassool 1993; 
Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff 1997; Selden 1999).28   It highlights the fact that financial capital is 
required for the smooth functioning of the entire economy, so that financial sanctions have implications 
that are more far-reaching.  In fact, depending on the financial state of the target country, financial 
sanctions might be considered the ultimate intermediate input – being necessary for every industry and at 
   
                                                          
26 Of course, one could reply that democratic regimes are more legitimate and more likely to rally its citizens behind 
the flag in resistance to the pressure of the sender countries (Galtung 1967).  
27 Pape challenges the importance of the regime variable by arguing that even where “ruling elites [sic] are 
unpopular, they can still often protect themselves and their supporters by shifting the economic burden of sanctions 
onto opponents or disenfranchised groups” (1997: 93). 
28 Lawmakers are catching up to the idea that financial sanctions are more effective by extolling the virtues of 
“smart sanctions,” like those imposed on Serbia that froze the foreign bank accounts of government officials and 
their cronies.  Strong supporters of scaling back economic sanctions include Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell and powerful congressmen Richard Lugar, Trent Lott, and Chuck Hagel, among others. 
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every level of production.  Like the potential effects of sociopolitical elements on the speed of resource 
adjustment, financial illiquidity might cripple a nation, and especially its elite (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
1992; Morgan and Schwebach 1995; Alerassool 1993), with otherwise mobile resources (Selden 1999).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we present a logical argument to demonstrate that the reason that economic 
sanctions appear to be ineffective is due to a mis-selection on the part of the senders.29  They rationally 
“pick” fights they believe they can win, but they are misguided in their choices of targets due to a 
misreading of the costs they can impose on their foes.  To remedy the situation, we propose an alternative 
measure of the costs of sanctions that focuses on structural features of a target’s economy and political 
elements that distort economic adjustment.  Our framework uncovers some counter-intuitive findings, for 
instance that developed economies are more likely to be affected by economic sanctions than less 
developed economies, but it also supports previous research indicating that financial sanctions are more 
likely to succeed and that sanctions that are imposed quickly are more efficient. Our next task is to 
provide a unified model of economic sanctions by adding empirical testing to our formal framework. 
                                                          
29 Our theoretical framework goes beyond a mere demonstration of “why sanctions don’t work,” and provide an 
explanation of under which circumstances sanctions “can” work. 
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